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We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to 
maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core 
constituencies on the one hand and ‘middle of the road’ voters with no partisan affiliation on 
the other hand. In contrast to ideology-driven individuals, ‘middle of the road’ voters care 
about the state of the economy in the sense that a policy reform is desirable for them when the 
fundamentals of the economy change. However, information is “sticky” in the sense that the 
process of information diffusion about the state of the economy, which is determined by some 
exogenous stochastic process, is imperfect. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that 
an increase in ideological polarization may enhance social welfare by mitigating the friction 
in information flow. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The fact that socially desirable policy reforms are often not adopted or substantially
delayed is indicative of the divergence between the benevolent social planner models,
the mainstay of traditional public economics literature, suggesting that reforms should
be immediately implemented with the prospect of a gain in social welfare, and real-
world economics. The political economy literature has attempted to provide a rational
explanation for these ostensibly irrational patterns of policy decision making. The key
premises on which the literature dwells heavily are the existence of in￿uential vested
interest groups1 and incomplete (and/or asymmetric) information regarding the costs
and bene￿ts entailed by the policy reform at stake.2
As argued by Drazen (2000), perhaps the most in￿uential vested interests are
politicians, whose primary objective is to gain political power (e.g., by getting elected
or by increasing their vote share), a goal generally not coinciding with social wel-
fare maximization. Politicians are often described as being driven not only by power
hunger but also by other factors such as ideology. One way to think about the ideo-
logical motive is parties￿ loyalty to their core constituencies. In a sense, thinking of
ideology in these terms suggests that parties are in fact driven by power hunger but
account for ideology to the extent that they care about the potential vote share of their
partisans whose political aﬃliation is shaped by their ideology. Indeed there is evi-
1The role of interest groups (the argument is often associated with Olson, 1982) relates to the
relevance of the existence of powerful groups blocking any attempt to adopt reforms that imperil
their narrow economic advantages, as an explanation for non-adoption of policy reforms from which
the society at large stands to gain. For further developments on the economics of special interest
groups, see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001).
2For example, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that when individual bene￿ts associated with a
certain policy reform are (ex-ante) uncertain and non-insurable, it may well be the case that a reform
desirable from an ex-post point of view of the majority of the electorate is nonetheless opposed, thus
rejected by a majority of the voters ex-ante. Another example for the role of imperfect information
in blocking a socially desirable policy reform concerns scenarios in which the policymaker is better
informed than the electorate regarding the state of the world, hence the desirable policy to implement.
But nonetheless, due to con￿icting objectives, he fails to credibly communicate this knowledge to the
voters, and hence fails to implement a socially desirable policy. The idea is explored in Cukierman
and Tommasi (1998a, 1998b) who show that a leftwing (rightwing, respectively) party might fail
to implement a leftwing (rightwing, respectively) socially desirable policy, because the electorate
suspects the proposal derives from partisan (ideological) motives rather than the bene￿to ft h e
voters themselves.
1dence indicating the ideological predispositions of a considerable part of the electorate.
As Tab. 1 shows, in 2000, a total share of around 7 percent of the U.S. population who
put themselves on the standard seven-point scale identi￿ed themselves as extremely
liberal (￿Left￿) or extremely conservative (￿Right￿),3 and around 46 percent reported
a clear position as liberal or conservative - albeit not necessarily being an extreme
one. There is further evidence indicating that ideological preferences ultimately shape
partisanship (see e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998, and Schreckhise and Shields,
2003). As Tab. 1 shows, around one-third strongly identify with either the Democrats
or Republicans, and two-thirds show at least a clear aﬃliation.
Table 1: Ideology and party identi￿ers in the U.S. in 2000.
in percent Extreme Left Clear Left Extreme Right Clear Right
Ideology 1.9 16.4 5.2 30.5
Party Identi￿cation 15.9 32.11 7.8 35.1
Data source: NES (2002).
Notes: Based on seven-point scale (1-7) on ideology and party identi￿cation. Ex-
treme position refers to the leftmost (1) and rightmost point (7) for ￿Left￿ and ￿Right￿
on this scale, respectively, whereas clear position refers to points 1 and 2 for ￿Left￿
and 6 and 7 for ￿Right￿ on this scale.
This paper examines the positive and normative implications of parties￿ motive
to cater to their core constituencies for the direction and timing of policy reforms.
In particular, we are interested in understanding the role of ideological polarization,
which we measure by the share of diehard constituencies of parties in their potential
number of voters. Prima facie, a rise in ideological polarization seems to bring about
more policy divergence and therefore appears to stand in con￿ict with social welfare
3Tab. 1 draws on the standard source for survey evidence in the political science literature, the
American National Election Study (NES, 2002). Respondents answered the following question: ￿We
hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. When it comes to politics, do you
usually think of yourself as Extremely Liberal, Liberal, Slightly Liberal, Moderate or
Middle of the Road, Slightly Conservative, Conservative, Extremely Conservative,
or haven￿t you thought much about this?￿ (NES, 2002; question F1).
2maximization-driven policy reforms. Indeed, the previous literature on polarization
and policy choice suggests that polarization is unambiguously detrimental for wel-
fare. For instance, Alesina (1988) analyzes a model in which parties are driven by
both policy outcomes and the desire to win the elections, but cannot commit to their
announced policy platforms after being elected to oﬃce. This renders any attempt
to propose policy platforms other than their ￿ideal￿ ones as incredible under a ￿nite
time horizon, whereas in an in￿nitely repeated game credibility may arise from the
possibility to build reputation. However, this becomes more diﬃcult with more polar-
ization, as measured by an increase in the distance between the parties￿ ideal points.
In a more recent paper, Schultz (1996) examines the impact of polarization on the
eﬃciency of public goods provision. In a model where parties are better informed than
voters about provision costs, and at least one party has preferences regarding public
goods provision that diﬀer suﬃciently from those of the median voter (i.e., there is
suﬃcient polarization), public goods provision is ineﬃcient.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that a rise in ideological polarization
may in general increase welfare. This result is derived by employing a dynamic two-
party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and
face the trade-oﬀ between catering to their respective diehard constituencies on the
one hand and ￿middle of the road￿ voters with no partisan aﬃliation on the other hand.
In contrast to diehards which are driven by ideology, ￿middle of the road￿ voters care
about the state of the economy in the sense that a policy reform is desirable for them
when the fundamentals of the economy change. However, information is ￿sticky￿ in
the sense that the process of information diﬀusion about the state of the economy,
which is determined by some exogenous stochastic process, is imperfect.4 In such a
set up, we show that an increase in ideological polarization may mitigate the friction
in information ￿ow, and thereby enhance social welfare.
4Slow dissemination of information is at the core of recent macroeconomic models of price adjust-
ment as proposed, e.g., by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Caroll (2003), and may be rationalized by
limited channels of humans for absorbing information, as suggested by Sims (2003). For empirical
evidence of such ￿boundedly rational￿ behavior in various contexts, see Caroll (2003) and Gabaix et
al. (2003).
3The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the coming section
we present the basic model. In section 3 we characterize the political equilibrium for
the ￿monopolistic￿ regime, namely the case where one party optimally responds to a
￿xed policy platform set by the other party, and examine the normative implications.
In section 4 we turn to the ￿competitive￿ case with two active (i.e., strategically in-
teracting) parties. Section 5 brie￿y discusses some empirical evidence which supports
our critical hypotheses on the behavior of diehard voters. Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an economy with two political parties, called leftwing (L)a n dr i g h t w i n g( R)
party. Each period t =0 ,1,2,... parties simultaneously choose a platform Pt from
a one-dimensional and time-invariant policy space P ∈ [ ﬂ PL ﬂ PR] ⊂ R, elections take
place, and the political outcome is determined by majority rule.
The economy bounces stochastically between states drawn from the time-invariant
space S = {S1,S 2} according to a symmetric Markov process. For instance, S1 and
S2 may be thought of the economy￿s fundamentals which (stochastically) change over
time. Let St denote the state of the economy in period t and let q = prob{St+1 =
Si |St = Si} be the probability that the economy is in state Si at date t +1given
that it was in state Si in t, i =1 ,2, q ∈ (0,1).T h u s , (1 − q)−1 is the expected
number of successive periods in which the economy is in a particular state (￿degree
of persistence￿). For concreteness S0 is given by S1.
There are three groups of voters, leftwing diehards, rightwing diehards and ￿middle
of the road￿ (M) individuals. For each group, there is a continuum of individuals, in
mass nL > 0, nR > 0 and nM ≡ 1, respectively. Diehard voters and M−voters diﬀer in
their sensitivity of policy preferences with respect to the state of the economy. Voting
behavior at each date of a typical M−voter, indexed j, is determined by maximization
of the present discounted value of the future stream of perceived utility u(P t, ￿ St,j),
where ￿ St,j ∈ {S1,S 2} denotes the state of the economy at time t as perceived by
4individual j.L e tu(P,•) be continuous and strictly quasi-concave as function of P,a n d
suppose that, for each state of the economy, P∗
i ≡ argmax
P∈P
u(P,Si) is in the interior of
the policy space,5 i.e. P∗
i ∈ ( ﬂ PL, ﬂ PR), i =1 ,2. We assume that u(Pt,S i) is the actual
utility derived from Pt at date t if St = Si, i =1 ,2. (This will become relevant for the
normative analysis, whereas perceptions of M−voters matter for voting behavior.)
There are many policy issues which are consistent with our set up, where some
exogenous shift in the fundamentals beyond the control of the policy maker calls for
policy reform. For instance, a balanced-budget rule may be an eﬃcient disciplining
device for bureaucrats in times of small business cycle swings but is harmful when the
economy is prone to energy crises from both a tax-smoothing perspective (as suggested
by dynamic optimal taxation theory) and in view of Keynesian stabilization policies
(see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996). In such a case S may refer to oil price volatility,
and P could measure the maximum public debt to GDP ratio.
We turn next to introduce the formation of perception by M−voters. Following
the literature on ￿sticky￿ information, based on limitations of humans to absorb infor-
mation which gives rise to inattention and thus to a slow dissemination of information
(e.g., Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Caroll, 2003; Sims, 2003), we make two generic assump-
tions. First, we assume that not all M−voters immediately adjust their perception
about the state of the economy to the true one when it changes. Second, the longer
the economy persists in a given state, the higher is the fraction of population that
perceives it correctly. To capture these patterns we focus on the following formula-
tion. Let xt
i denote the fraction of M−voters in period t who believe that the economy
currently is in state Si, i =1 ,2, i.e., xt
1 + xt
2 =1 . (Formally, xt
i is the measure of
the set {j| ￿ St,j = Si}, i =1 ,2.) We assume that xt





















if St+1 = Si0,
(1)
i 6= i0,w h e r eK ≥ 1 is an integer and, for concreteness, x0
1 is given as 1.N o t e t h a t
5Note that P∗
1 and P∗
2 are unique by virtue of our assumptions on u.
5the parameter K measures the degree of information stickiness, i.e., the larger K is,
the slower the diﬀusion of information.6 For future reference denote by zt the tuple
(St,x t
1).
Diehard voters are characterized as follows. Leftwing diehards never vote for party
R and rightwing diehards never support party L. The preferred policy of leftwing
diehards is ﬂ PL, whereas the one of rightwing diehards is ﬂ PR. ﬂ PL and ﬂ PR are common
knowledge. Within the two groups of diehard voters, individuals are heterogenous in
the utility γ derived from voting for (i.e., supporting) their respective party. Let FL(γ)
and FR(γ) denote the c.d.f. of γ for leftwing and rightwing diehards, respectively, and
fL(γ) and fR(γ) t h er e s p e c t i v ep . d . f .F o ry = L,R,b o t hFy(γ) and fy(γ) are assumed
to be continuous, with support being the interval [0,ﬂ γ].I fp r o p o s e d p l a t f o r m Pt
L of
party L at time t diﬀers from ﬂ PL, a leftwing diehard obtains disutility P t
L− ﬂ PL,i . e . ,s h e
supports party L if γ ≥ P t
L− ﬂ PL. Otherwise, she withdraws support and abstains from
voting (not turning to party R either) and derives zero utility.7 Thus, given platform
P t
L, the mass of leftwing diehards supporting party L is given by
£
1 − FL(P t
L − ﬂ PL)
⁄
nL.
Similarly, suppose that given platform Pt
R, the mass of rightwing diehards supporting
party R is given by
£
1 − FR( ﬂ PR − Pt
R)
⁄
nR. Let us suppose ﬂ γ ≥ ﬂ PR− ﬂ PL. This ensures
that party L still has diehard voters even when setting a platform close to ﬂ PR.8
6Information diﬀusion about the state of the economy may be modelled in alternative ways.
For instance, in a similar way to Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003) who model in￿ation
expectations, we could assume that each period a fraction λ of M−individuals learn the current state,
whereas all other individuals retain the view held in the previous period. As a result, information
dissipates as follows: xt+1
i = xt
i + λ(1 − xt
i) if St+1 = Si and xt+1
i =( 1− λ)xt
i if St+1 = Si0,
i 6= i0. An alternative way to think about this is as follows. Suppose a fraction λ of M−individuals
are ￿experts￿, who immediately grasp the economic situation correctly, and update their perception
accordingly (for instance, due to higher intellectual capacity, better exposure to information, more
interest in politics, and the like). After learning a new state, M−individuals randomly match with
each other every period, such that non-experts learn the current state when meeting an expert.
Similarly, process (1) is implied by assuming that there are 1/K experts each meeting exactly one
non-expert who holds wrong beliefs (if there are such individuals) each period. It is easy to see that,
assuming λ =1 /K, this leads to faster dissemination of information than the former process with
random matching. Although both kinds of ￿herding￿ behavior are similar in spirit, assuming the
former process rather than the one in (1) complicates our analysis, however, to the point of analytical
intractability.
7In contrast, for simplicity, abstention of M−voters is exogenous, i.e., there is a unit mass of
M−individuals in the electorate.
8Section 5 discusses empirical evidence which supports our assumptions on the behavior of diehard
voters, showing that (i) ideology strongly aﬀects partisanship, (ii) partisanship provides social identi-
6We turn next to the political parties. The utility derived by party y = L,R in
period t is assumed to be an increasing function vj of the number of supporters in t,d e -
noted Nt




0 < ρy < 1, i.e., parties are completely opportunistic/￿Downsian￿ (Downs, 1957). The
reason why parties may be motivated by the number of supporters rather than aiming
at a simple majority may be manifold (but exogenous to the model). For instance,
the seats in parliament may depend on vote share, and accordingly, a larger number
of parliament members aﬃliated with the party may be eligible for certain ￿perks￿ or
privileges. Moreover, decisions in parliament may require supermajority.9
Given the objective functions of parties, this implies that in each period t party
y = L,R simply maximizes the number of supporters Nt
y.D e n o t eb ymt
y the number
of M−voters which support party y at time t.T h u s ,Nt
L and Nt
























respectively. Note that one can interpret the objective functions along the lines of
the standard literature in political economy in which parties are usually assumed to
be driven by both ideology and power hunger (see e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1998;
Drazen, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000).10 In a sense we provide a microfoundation
to the somewhat vague ideology-term in the objective of parties by describing the
trade-oﬀ faced by parties as one between their ideology-driven partisans (￿diehards￿)
and voters who adapt their policy preferences to changing economic environments.
￿cation which makes defection psychologically diﬃcult, and (iii) voting abstention is strongly related
to the preferred party￿s proposed policy platforms.
9See Dixit and Londregan (1998, p. 506f.) for further discussion of the assumption that parties
are motivated by their vote share.
10To see this note that the ￿rst term in the objective function de￿nes the loss associated with
deviating from the ideal point given by ﬂ PL and ﬂ PR for party L and R, respectively. Then one can
refer to M−voters as the entire electorate and interpret ny accordingly as the relative importance of
ideology vis a vis power per se for party y = L,R. (The latter Downsian motive is called ￿egorance￿
by Rogoﬀ and Sibert, 1988.)
7In the sense that an increase in nL or nR, respectively, induces parties to put
more weight on their diehard constituencies, it seems natural to provide the following
simple measure for ideological polarization. Society A is said to be more polarized
t h a ns o c i e t yBi fnA
y /(nA
M +nA
y ) ≥ nB
y /(nB
M +nB
y ) for y = L,R, with at least one strict
inequality. In words, the share of the diehard constituency of party y in its potential
number of voters (which does not include the diehards of the other party) in society
A strictly exceeds that of society B for at least one of the parties, and weakly exceeds
it for both parties.11
We assume that parties observe xt
i, i =1 ,2, (the perception distribution of
M−voters) but may or may not observe the true state of the economy. Note that as
parties￿ objectives do not depend on the true state and M−voters are aware of this
fact, no signaling will take place, and an information asymmetry with respect to St
will have no implication on the perception of voters.12
We will look for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the continuation game.
One simplifying assumption we implicitly made is that the platforms set by political
parties do not aﬀect the state variable zt =( St,x t
1). This implies that restricting
attention to the Nash equilibrium period by period, provided that all parties base
their strategies on the current information as speci￿ed above, forms a Markov perfect
equilibrium for the continuation game. Also note that a typical M−voter j chooses
P t ∈ {P t
L,Pt
R} to maximize perceived utility u(Pt, ￿ St,j) at date t.
3 One Active Party (￿Monopoly￿)
We start by analyzing a simple case in which party R is purely ideologically driven,
thus seeking to maximize the support within its diehard constituency, thereby setting
11Since an increase in polarization means that population weights shift from the center to the
sides of the policy space, our measure of polarization is an application of the axiomatically derived
measure (applicable for various contexts) by Esteban and Ray (1994).
12In contrast, Schultz (1996) and Cukierman and Tommasi (1998a, 1998b) present models in which
the state of the economy is known to parties but not to voters, and enters the parties￿ objectives. In
such a set up, voters￿ perception may be aﬀected by policy platforms in equilibrium.
8its platform to ﬂ PR in all periods.13 For instance, we may assume that M−voters
believe that party R is only concerned about ideology and thus in case it is elected
will resort to its diehard constituency. Then no matter what party R proposes it will
be discounted by the M−voters. That said, the optimal response to party R will be
indeed to ful￿l this prophecy.
Suppose for simplicity that if M−voters are indiﬀerent between the platforms set
by the two parties, they support party L.14 Also for simplicity, we assume that if
party L is indiﬀerent between two platforms, it chooses the platform which is closer
to ﬂ PL. Let us de￿ne
P
min
i (P) ≡ min(P
0 ∈ P| u(P
0,S i) ≥ u(P,Si)),i =1 ,2, (4)
w h e r ew es u p p o s ePmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) 6= P min
2 ( ﬂ PR); without loss of generality, let
P
min
1 ( ﬂ PR) >P
min





3.1 Behavior of Party L
As we can restrict attention to period by period outcomes, we suppress the time
index t in the following wherever it does not lead to confusion. Given PR = ﬂ PR,o u r
assumptions imply the following for the payoﬀ function of party L.
Lemma 1. Under A1,
NL = πL(PL, ﬂ PR) ≡

   
   
£
1 − FL(PL − ﬂ PL)
⁄
nL if PL ∈ [ ﬂ PL,Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR))
£
1 − FL(PL − ﬂ PL)
⁄
nL +1− x1 if PL ∈ [Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR),Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR))
£
1 − FL(PL − ﬂ PL)
⁄
nL +1 if PL ∈ [Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR), ﬂ PR].
(5)
13A similar implication is derived by Cukierman and Tommasi (1998a), who assume a higher
level of commitment of an incumbent to the voters (to implement its proposed policy) relative to a
challenger.
14Alternatively, one may assume that votes are split equally by M−individuals in case of a tie (as
we do in section 4, where both parties are active). This would not alter the basic insights from the
analysis in this section but would be costly in terms of expositional simplicity.
9Proof. Consider the ￿rst line in (5). By virtue of assumption A1 and the de￿nition
in (4), it follows from the single-peakedness of u that only leftwing diehards support
party L. Moreover, recall that M−voters support L whenever they are indiﬀerent
between two parties. Thus, if PL ≥ Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR),p a r t yL receives support from a mass
x2 =1− x1 of M−voters who believe the economy is in state 2. If PL ≥ Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR),
also the remaining M−individuals support party L. This concludes the proof.
Let ￿ PL ≡ arg max
PL∈P
πL(PL, ﬂ PR) denote the optimal response of party L to ﬂ PR.O u r
￿rst proposition characterizes the optimal choice of party L.T h ep r o o fo ft h i sp r o p o -
sition, as those of all other formal subsequent statements, are relegated to Appendix
A.
Proposition 1. Under A1. Suppose FL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL < 1,15 and let




1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL) − FL(P
min
2 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)
⁄
nL.
Then (i) x1 ≤ c( ﬂ PR, ﬂ PL,n L) implies ￿ PL = Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR), whereas (ii) x1 >c ( ﬂ PR, ﬂ PL,n L)
implies ￿ PL = Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR).
The dilemma faced by the policy maker is to choose between Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR), attracting
all M−voters, and P min
2 ( ﬂ PR), attracting more diehards but only M−voters who believe
that the state of the economy is S2. According to Proposition 1,i nt h i sc a s e ,Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR)
is chosen whenever the share of M−voters who currently believe that the state of the
economy is S1, x1,i ss u ﬃciently high, and Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) is chosen otherwise. The threshold
c( ﬂ PR, ﬂ PL,n L) re￿ects the loss of diehard voters when party L switches policy from
P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) to Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR), where it gains (a mass of) c diehards from the opposite switch.
Similarly, x1 is the gain in M−voters when switching from Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) to P min
1 ( ﬂ PR),a n d
the loss when switching in the opposite direction. Note that assumption A1 implies
15Otherwise, nL > 1=nM necessarily holds, which implausibly implies that the population of
diehards exceeds that of the M−voters. Suggestive evidence, supporting this implausibility, may be
f o u n di nT a b .1, interpreting voters possessing extreme party identi￿cation as diehards. (We analyze
the cases arising when presumption FL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR)− ﬂ PL)nL < 1 does not hold in a supplement available
on request.)
10c>0 and FL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL < 1 implies c<1. Suppose now the state of the
economy is S2, say, and the current policy chosen is Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR). Also suppose the
state of the economy changes and persists for a while. To exemplify the role of the
switching cost and the stickiness of information consider two scenarios. One scenario
is where K =1(i.e., perfect information of M−voters), then x1 =1if S = S1 and
x1 =0otherwise. Thus, party L immediately switches to Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) when the state of
the economy changes from S2 to S1. In contrast, if K>1,p a r t yL does not adjust its
policy immediately. In fact, the larger c (the switching cost) is, the longer it would
take to change the policy. An implication is that when information is sticky, and the
core constituency of party L, nL, is relatively large, then party L would be slow in
implementing reforms that require a rightward shift from Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) to Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR).B y
a similar line of reasoning, party L would be quick to adopt reforms in the opposite
direction.16 To conclude, higher ideological polarization does not necessarily delay
reforms in a positive sense.
3.2 Normative Implications
Next, we turn to normative implications of the behavior of party L. To avoid trivial
cases, we assume that party L always wins the elections. A suﬃcient condition for
that would be to assume that the diehard population of party R, nR, is relatively
small. Throughout the paper, social welfare will be measured by the discounted
expected utility derived by a fully informed M−voter, that is, the utility based on
the true state of the economy. Two remarks are in order. First, note that expected
utility relates to the stochastic process that determines the state of the economy and
not to the fact that there is a distribution of perceptions. We will assume that the
discount rate is suﬃciently small, hence, we con￿ne attention to the stationary welfare
￿ow (i.e., the average utility based on the limiting distribution of the state variable
z =( S,x1), which we characterize below in Lemma 2). Moreover, note that we
16For instance, conservative governments may be quick to implement measures for internal security
(which may be costly in terms of resources and civil liberties) in times of high terror threats, but
may be slow to switch back to a liberal environment after terror groups dissolve.
11focus on the welfare of the M−voters only, which can be warranted in two manners.
First, following the possible interpretation of the diehard population as the ideology
component in a standard objective function of parties, accounting for both power
hunger and ideological motives, M−voters form the entire electorate. Second, even
when the welfare of diehards does matter, one can assume that the gain derived by
one party￿s diehard constituency associated with policy reforms is just outweighed by
the loss suﬀered by the other party￿s diehards, where gain and loss is measured in
deviations from core ideology.
We are interested in examining how the presence of the friction in information ￿ow
(i.e., K>1) and the existence of switching costs (c)a ﬀect utility of M−voters. De￿ne
ui0,i ≡ u(Pmin
i0 ( ﬂ PR),S i), i0,i =1 ,2. Recalling that the utility function of M−voters
has an interior maximum in both states of the economy, by virtue of assumption A1
and the de￿nition of P min
1 ( ﬂ PR), it necessarily follows that u2,1 <u 1,1. We illustrate
this in panel (a) of Fig. 1 (where P min
2 ( ﬂ PR)= ﬂ PL). However, as regards to S2,a s
illustrated in panel (b) of Fig. 1, there are two possibilities to consider. The ￿rst case
depicted by the solid line refers to a scenario in which u2,2 >u 1,2, i.e., there would be
a welfare gain from switching whenever the state of the economy shifts. This coincides
with the natural notion of desirable policy reforms and, in this sense, turns out to be
analogous to the case of strategically interacting parties, as analyzed in section 4. By
contrast, the second case (without any analogy in section 4) depicted by the dashed
line refers to a scenario in which u2,2 <u 1,2. In such a case, welfare is always higher
if Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) is implemented than under Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR).
The stochastic process that determines the evolution of z =( S,x1),g i v e nb yt h e
Markov process governing the state of the economy and process (1) governing x1,i s
essentially a random walk process with two absorbing states (the cases in which the
whole population perceives the state of the economy (correctly) as either S1 or as
S2). One can derive the transition matrix for the process, de￿ned over the state set
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PThe result is stated as Lemma 2.17
Lemma 2. As t →∞ , the distribution of zt =( St,x t
1) can be characterized as:
prob{z
t =( S1,1)} = prob{z
t =( S2,0)} =
0.5
1+( K − 1)(1 − q)
≡ ￿ p, (6)
prob{z
t =( Si,k/K)} =( 1− q)￿ p for all i =1 ,2,k=1 ,...,K − 1. (7)
As in each period of time the state of the economy is either S1 or S2,a n dt h e
implemented policy is either P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) or Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR),i ts u ﬃces from a normative per-
spective to partition the state set Z into a set of policy relevant subsets given by
Zi0,i, i0,i =1 ,2,w h e r eZi0,i is de￿ned as the set of all elements of Z for which the
implemented policy is P min
i0 ( ﬂ PR) and the state of the economy is Si. Each subset
Zi0,i de￿nes an event with an associated probability measure denoted by αi0,i.T h u s ,




i αi0,i • ui0,i.B yv i r t u eo f
the symmetry of the Markov process, it follows that
P
i0 αi0,i =0 .5 for i =1 ,2.T h u s ,
the expected utility E(u) can be written
E(u)=α2,1∆2,1 + α1,2∆1,2 + β, (8)
where ∆2,1 ≡ u2,1 − u1,1, ∆1,2 ≡ u1,2 − u2,2 and β =0 .5(u1,1 + u2,2).( R e c a l l t h a t
u2,1 <u 1,1, i.e., ∆2,1 < 0. )I nt h ec a s ew h e r e∆1,2 < 0 (solid line in panel (b) of Fig.
1) one could refer to Z1,2 and Z2,1 as ￿mismatch￿ events in the sense that relative to
the set of possible political outcomes, {Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR),Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR)}, given the state of the
economy, the choice taken is suboptimal. In the case where ∆1,2 > 0,t h em i s m a t c h
events are Z2,1 and Z2,2 since P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) is preferred to Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) by M−voters in either
17From Lemma 2, one can de￿ne a positive measure of policy reform stickiness, namely the mean
time it takes to switch between policies. This measure is formally derived for the monopoly case in
Appendix B (and could be applied mutatis mutandis to the competitive case in section 4). However,
as we show in the following, a higher mean time between switches is not necessarily detrimental.
Thus, one cannot judge by this positive measure of stickiness alone the normative implications.
13state of the economy.18 Proposition 2 states formally the normative implications of
the political equilibrium, where we take the stationary ￿ow of expected utility E(u)
as our welfare measure. (An informal interpretation would follow.)
Proposition 2. Suppose FL(P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL < 1 and assumption A1 holds.
(a) If ∆1,2 < 0, then (i) when the degree of information stickiness is small (K is
suﬃciently small), E(u) is strictly decreasing in K, (ii) when information is sticky
(K>1), then an increase in nL (higher polarization) may result in an increase in
E(u), and (iii) E(u) is strictly increasing in q.
(b) If ∆1,2 > 0, then (i) for any K,a ni n c r e a s ei nK may result in an increase in
E(u), (ii) if anything, E(u) is decreasing in nL, and (iii) the impact of an increase
in q on E(u) is ambiguous.
Let us start with the discussion of part (a). First, as long as K is not too large
(the degree of information stickiness is limited), a rise in K reduces welfare, E(u).19
In particular, part (a) of Proposition 2 implies that E(u) is higher under perfect
information (K =1 ) than in the case of imperfect information (K>1). This is
because under perfect information the policy chosen by party L is always optimal
relative to the set of possible political outcomes, {P min
1 ( ﬂ PR),Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR)}, i.e., there
18Also note that due to ￿imperfect competition￿ among parties, even with perfect information
(i.e., if K =1 ), the choice in any event is suboptimal compared to the ￿rst-best social optimum (P∗
i
for Si, i =1 ,2).
19If ∆2,1 6= ∆1,2,t h e na ni n c r e a s ei nK may increase E(u) when K is large. This is because a
higher K may have a non-uniform impact on mismatch probabilities α1,2 and α2,1. That is, although
α1,2+α2,1 =
0.5(K−1)(1−q)
1+(K−1)(1−q) (see the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A) unambiguously rises with
K,i ti sp o s s i b l et h a t ,s a y ,α2,1 decreases with K. Thus, if at the same time |∆2,1| >> |∆1,2|, i.e.,
the welfare loss from policy Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) when the state of the economy is S1 is suﬃciently higher
than the loss from policy Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) when the state of the economy is S2,t h e nE(u) rises with K.
When K is not too large, however, the eﬀect of the rise in the overall probability of mismatch turns
out to be dominating the other eﬀect of a shift in probabilities across mismatch events. Anyway,
we do not consider the possibility that E(u) rises with K to be interesting in the case ∆1,2 < 0,
as it seems to be a knife-edge scenario. Basically, it is merely an implication of the fact that the
stochastic variable x1 evolves in discrete steps, i.e., x1 ∈ {0,1/K,2/K,...,1}. Moreover, note that if
∆2,1 = ∆1,2, then the shift in probability across the two mismatch events has no impact on welfare,
as can be observed from (8). In this case, the result holds for any K. In fact, the shift in probabilities
across mismatch event can work in the other direction by further increasing the likelihood of the
more harmful mismatch event (among the two possible).
14is zero probability of a mismatch event (α2,1 = α1,2 =0if K =1 ). In contrast,
if K>1, then it is possible that party L chooses, say, P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) (which happens
if x1 ≤ c, according to Proposition 1), although the state of the economy is S1,o r
chooses P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) although the economy is in S2. Second, if nL and thus switching
costs c increase (i.e., ideological polarization rises), if anything, the probability of a
mismatch event Z2,1 (i.e., party L chooses P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) although the state of the economy
is S1), α2,1,r i s e sa n dα1,2 falls. If the loss in expected utility from an increase in α2,1
is lower than the welfare gain from a reduction in α1,2, welfare rises. Third, note that
whenever M−voters have reached consensus regarding the state of the economy (i.e.,
zt ∈ {(S1,1),(S2,0)}), there is no mismatch. From (6), as t →∞ , the probability
that the economy is in such an absorbing state, ￿ p, is rising in the degree of persistence
of the economy, (1 − q)−1. Thus, welfare rises if q rises.
Now consider part (b), which refers to the case in which M−voters always prefer
P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) to P min
2 ( ﬂ PR). First, expected utility may generally rise if the degree of
information stickiness rises. In particular, and in contrast to part (a), welfare may
be lower in perfect information than under imperfect information. This is because,
when Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) is preferred to P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) in both states of the economy, a higher K
may increase the probability that Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) is chosen in S2, α1,2. If the gain from
this exceeds the welfare loss from an increase in α2,1, overall welfare rises. This
result is a typical second-best argument, where adding another distortion (i.e., an
information friction) to the imperfect competition among parties may raise welfare.
Second, since the frequency of party L choosing Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) declines with c,i fa n y t h i n g ,
higher ideological polarization is detrimental for welfare. Finally, since an increase
in the probability that P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) is chosen in S1 is harmful whereas increase in the
probability that Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) is chosen in S2 is bene￿cial if ∆1,2 > 0,w e l f a r em a yb e
decreasing or increasing in q.
154 Two Active Parties (￿Competition￿)
In the analysis of two competing parties, suppose that if M−voters are indiﬀerent
between the platforms set by the two parties, half of the votes from each group of
individuals go to either party. Analogously to (4), let us de￿ne20
P
max
i (P) ≡ max(P
0 ∈ P| u(P
0,S i) ≥ u(P,Si)),i =1 ,2. (9)
4.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We now turn to the analysis of the role of information diﬀusion and the role of the
diehard constituencies for the (equilibrium) behavior of two Downsian parties which
simultaneously choose policy platforms in each period. Regarding possible Nash equi-
libria in pure strategies, the following ￿rst result holds.
Lemma 3. Strategy pairs other than Py = ﬂ Py for y = L,R or PL = PR ∈
{P ∗
1,P∗
2} c a n n o tb eN a s he q u i l i b r i ai np u r es t r a t e g i e s .
According to Lemma 3, there may only exist two types of equilibria: either
both parties maximize utility of their diehards or they set platforms at the peak of
M−individuals￿ utility function for one of the two states of the economy. Conditions
for the equilibrium in which parties are oriented to their diehards in pure strategy
Nash equilibrium and their positive implications are considered in a supplement to
this paper available on request. The focus, however, lies on the case in which either
P ∗
1 or P∗
2 may be implemented in equilibrium.
We ￿rst continue by considering necessary conditions for a pure strategy equilib-
rium in which PL = PR ∈ {P∗
1,P∗
2}. It is crucial for our analysis to assume that the






2 > ﬂ PL. (A2)
20Note from the single-peakedness of u and (4) that Pmin
i (P)=P for all P ≤ P∗
i and, similarly,
Pmax
i (P)=P for all P ≥ P∗
i , according to (9), i =1 ,2.
16Lemma 4. Under A2, in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium such that PL = PR =
P ∗
i , FL(P ∗
i − ﬂ PL)nL ≤ 0.5, FR( ﬂ PR − P∗
i )nR ≤ 0.5 and xi > 0.5 must hold, i =1 ,2.
According to Lemma 4, for a pure strategy equilibrium such that PL = PR = P∗
i
to exist (i.e., policy platforms of parties fully converge), two conditions are neces-
sary. First, diehard voters must not be too important quantitatively (for instance,
if nL,n R ≤ 0.5, PL = PR = P∗
i may be a pure strategy equilibrium), i.e., the gain
from deviating towards diehards has to be suﬃciently low. Second, a strict majority
of M−voters have to believe that the state of the economy is Si, i =1 ,2.21 The next
result deals with uniqueness of equilibrium.
Lemma 5. Under A2, given x1 ∈ [0,1], any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
is unique.
We now come to the main result in the positive analysis of the competition case.
Proposition 3. Under A2. Suppose FL
¡
P∗
1 − ﬂ PL
¢
nL ≤ 0.5 and FR




0.5. Then the following holds.











1) − ﬂ PL
¢⁄
nL ≡ ﬂ x(nL, ﬂ PL,P∗
1),t h e n
there is a unique Nash equilibrium such that PL = PR = P∗
1.
(ii) If x1 ≤ 0.5−
£
FR








nR ≡ x(nR, ﬂ PR,P∗
2),t h e n
there is a unique Nash equilibrium such that PL = PR = P∗
2.
(iii) If x1 ∈
¡
x(nR, ﬂ PR,P∗
2), ﬂ x(nL, ﬂ PL,P∗
1)
¢
, then no Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies exists.
Proposition 3 implies that when a suﬃcient majority of M−voters believe in Si as
the state of the economy, parties converge to the same policy platform, P∗
i . However,
the necessary conditions for such an equilibrium (in pure strategies) to exist are not
suﬃcient. In particular, if xi > 0.5 but small, PL = PR = P∗
i may not be an
equilibrium, i =1 ,2, even if the presumptions in Lemma 4 hold. The range (x, ﬂ x) in
21Of course, even if PL = PR = P∗
i , policy platforms may be set at ineﬃcient levels from the
perspective of M−individuals, since the actual state of the economy may be Si0, i0 6= i. This is the
subject of the normative analysis below.
17which, according to part (iii) of Proposition 3, no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
exists will henceforth be referred to as the ￿black hole￿ range. This range widens if
ideological polarization rises. To gain insight why such a ￿black hole￿ range arises,
consider, for instance, a situation in which both parties propose P∗
1.I ns u c hac a s e ,
each party will attract one half of the M−voters￿ constituency, which equals 0.5.N o w
consider, say, a leftward deviation of party L to some PL >P min
2 (P∗
1). Obviously, party
L will lose all M−voters with perception ￿ S = S1 but still attract all M−voters with
perception ￿ S = S2. Being in a ￿black hole￿ range implies that the number of M−voters
with perception ￿ S = S2 lies suﬃciently close to 0.5.T h u s , t h e l o s s o f M−voters
will be rather small. On the other hand, party L will gain the support of additional
diehards. Hence, such a deviation will be pro￿table, rendering an equilibrium (P ∗
1,P∗
1)
impossible, even if x1 > 0.5. (Also recall that (P ∗
1,P∗
1) is the only candidate for a
pure strategy equilibrium if x1 > 0.5 under the presumptions of Proposition 3.)22
4.2 An Approximation Result
In the previous section we have characterized the equilibria of the political game in
the two-party case (￿competition￿). As Proposition 3 states formally, there exists a
range of parameters for which no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Moreover, due
to the discontinuity of the parties￿ payoﬀ functions, also existence of mixed strategy
equilibria within the ￿black hole￿ range is not generally ensured. In order to be able to
examine the normative implications of the model, we simplify the analysis by assum-
ing that, rather than focusing on the continuum case, the policy set is approximated
by a (suﬃciently ￿ne) grid. A grid will ensure the existence of equilibrium throughout
(including one in mixed strategies in the black hole range), and, provided that it is
suﬃciently ￿ne, maintain the properties of the continuum case (as stated by Propo-
sition 3). The ability to construct such a grid derives from the discontinuity of the
22As shown in the supplement to this paper, if nL and nR are not too high (but higher than implied
by the presumptions of Proposition 3), for an equilibrium in which Py = ﬂ Py, y = L,R (for at least
some x1) to exist, it is necessary that x1 is in a range which includes 0.5. Interestingly, comparison
with Proposition 3 reveals that this is the opposite result as for existence of an equilibrium in which
PL = PR = P∗
i , i =1 ,2.
18parties￿ payoﬀ functions. We turn to state the result formally.
Proposition 4. Under the presumptions of Proposition 3, there exists a suf-
￿ciently ￿ne policy grid, given by a subset of the policy space, P, which includes
the policy elements P∗
1, P∗
2, ﬂ PL and ﬂ PR such that the results stated by Proposition
3 hold; furthermore, there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies if x1 ∈
¡
x(nR, ﬂ PR,P∗





We turn next to study the normative implications using the following simple exam-
ple. We assume that K =3and let the policy grid be comprised of four elements
P ∗
1, P ∗
2, ﬂ PL and ﬂ PR. We further assume that the distributions of diehard voters sat-
isfy the following properties: FL
¡
P∗
2 − ﬂ PL
¢
= FR










¡ ﬂ PR − P∗
2
¢
=3 /4,a n dFL
¡ ﬂ PR − ﬂ PL
¢
= FR
¡ ﬂ PR − ﬂ PL
¢
=1 . We further suppose
4/9 <n y < 2/3, y = L,R, and, last, assume
u(P
∗
2,S 2) >u (P
∗
1,S 2)=u( ﬂ PL,S 2) >u ( ﬂ PR,S 2), (10)
u(P
∗
1,S 1) >u (P
∗
2,S 1)=u( ﬂ PR,S 1) >u ( ﬂ PL,S 1). (11)
It follows that Pmin
2 (P∗
1)= ﬂ PL and P max
1 (P ∗
2)= ﬂ PR. This implies in turn (us-
ing the de￿nitions given in Proposition 3) that ﬂ x =1 /2+3 nL/4 and x =1 /2 −
3nR/4. In our simple setting, the state space of the economy is given by Z =
{(S1,1/3),(S1,2/3),(S1,1),(S2,0),(S2,1/3),(S2,2/3)}. Note that the two absorbing
states [(S1,1) and (S2,0)], lie outside the ￿black hole￿ range, whereas all other states
lie inside. We turn next to verify that in this example indeed the grid is suﬃciently
￿ne to satisfy the properties stated in Proposition 3. By virtue of symmetry it suﬃces
to focus on the cases x1 =1and x1 =2 /3.
We ￿rst analyze the case x1 =1 . Following part (i) of Proposition 3, we turn to
show that the only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is the pair (P∗
1,P∗
1).F o rt h i s
p u r p o s ew ec a l c u l a t et h ep a y o ﬀ matrix for the case x1 =1in Tab. 2.
19As a guide to interpreting Tab. 2, consider the case where both parties choose to
propose a platform given by P ∗
1.I ns u c hac a s et h eM−voters split evenly between
the two parties, as they propose the same platform. Turning next to the diehard
constituencies, however, as P ∗
1 is relatively more consistent with the core ideology
of party R, the latter manages to preserve the allegiance of the bulk of its diehard
constituency (attracting half of it), whereas party L is left with only the most diehard
supporters (which amount to one quarter of its diehard constituency). This can be
veri￿ed by employing the distribution of diehard voters for the two parties, recalling
that FR
¡ ﬂ PR − P ∗
1
¢
=1 /2 while FL
¡
P ∗
1 − ﬂ PL
¢
=3 /4. Close inspection of the payoﬀ
matrix reveals that ﬂ PL and ﬂ PR are dominated strategies for party R and party L,
respectively, as they are dominated by ﬂ PR and P ∗
2, correspondingly. After the ￿rst
iteration of elimination of strictly dominated strategies, it is easy to verify that P∗
1 is
a dominant strategy for party L (employing the fact that nL < 2/3). It is also easy
to observe that P ∗
1 i st h eb e s tr e s p o n s eo fp a r t yR when P∗
1 is proposed by party L.
Thus, we conclude that indeed the pair (P ∗
1,P∗
1) forms a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies for the case x1 =1 , in line with part (i) of Proposition 1.I n v o k i n g
symmetry, one can show, repeating the above argument, that for the case x1 =0 ,
the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is given by the pair (P∗
2,P∗
2),w h i c h
veri￿es part (ii) of Proposition 3.
We turn next to the case x1 =2 /3 (and by virtue of symmetry, x1 =1 /3), for
which we need to show that there exists no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (thus
verifying part (iii) of Proposition 3). By virtue of the ￿nite grid, we will be able to
characterize a (unique) Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for this case. For these
purposes we re-calculate the payoﬀ matrix for the case x1 =2 /3 in Tab. 3.
Close inspection of the payoﬀ matrix reveals that ﬂ PL and ﬂ PR are still dominated
strategies for party R and party L, respectively, as they are (still) dominated by ﬂ PR
and P ∗
2, correspondingly. Moreover, P∗
2 is dominated by ﬂ PR for party R.I n t h e
second iteration of elimination of strictly dominated strategies, using the parametric
restriction, 4/9 <n L < 2/3, one can show that P∗
2 is dominated by P ∗
1 for party L.
20Table 2: Payoff matrix for  1 1 = x . 
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Table 3: Payoff matrix for  3 / 2 1 = x . 
   R  *
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Table 4: Payoff matrix for  3 / 2 1 = x  without dominated strategies. 
   R  *
1 P   R P  
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L
L
LThus, we are left with the two-by-two payoﬀ matrix in Tab. 4.
Let 0 <l<1 and 0 <r<1 denote the probability measures assigned by party L
and party R, respectively, to the platform P∗
1 for x1 =2 /3, and, by symmetry, to P∗
2
for x1 =1 /3. We obtain reaction functions for x1 =2 /3 and x1 =1 /3 as shown in
panels (a) and (b) of Fig. 2, respectively.
In equilibrium each party should be indiﬀerent between any strategies to which it
assigns a strictly positive probability measure. The following lemma characterizes the
unique equilibrium in mixed strategies, (l∗,r∗), within the ￿black hole￿ range.
Lemma 6. In our example, if x1 =2 /3, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (in
mixed strategies), which is given by l∗ =3 nR/2−1/2 and r∗ =2 −9nL/4.I fx1 =1 /3,
l∗ =2− 9nR/4 and r∗ =3 nL/2 − 1/2.
Equilibrium in mixed strategies implies political instability in the ￿black hole￿
range in the sense that parties randomize their strategies. The platform realizations
of both parties are set for voting and policy is determined by a majority rule by the
electorate. We turn to characterize the implemented policy for each pair of platform
realizations for the case x1 =2 /3 (again, the case x1 =1 /3 is symmetric). Obviously,
when both parties propose P∗
1, the implemented policy is P∗
1 (this scenario occurs
with probability l∗ • r∗). Consider next the case where party L proposes P ∗
1,w h e r e a s
party R proposes ﬂ PR [the probability of which is given by l∗ • (1 − r∗)]. In such a
case, it immediately follows from Tab. 3 that P∗
1 is implemented under majority rule,
by virtue of our parametric assumptions. In the case where party L proposes ﬂ PL
whereas party R proposes P∗
1 [which occurs with probability (1−l∗)•r∗], the number
of supporters of party L￿s platform is given by nL +1 /6, which is bounded above
by 5/6 (as nL < 2/3), thus being obviously lower than the number of supporters in
party R￿s platform. Thus, in this case P∗
1 is implemented again. Last, when party
L proposes ﬂ PL, whereas party R proposes ﬂ PR,p a r t yR is obviously the winner, as it
can be observed from Tab. 3. Note that, according to Lemma 6, this occurs with
probability (1 − l∗) • (1 − r∗)=3 /2(1 − nR)(9/4nL − 1) ≡ p(nL,n R).
21We turn next to calculate the expected utility derived by an (informed) M−voter,
E(u), based on the limiting distribution of z =( S,x1) (whose support is given by the
set Z).
Lemma 7. In our example, expected utility derived by a M−voter is given by
E(u)=Const+
0.5(1 − q)
1+2 ( 1− q)
￿






















Within the ￿black hole￿ range, there are four states in which a mismatch occurs with
positive probability, (S1,1/3), (S1,2/3), (S2,1/3),a n d(S2,2/3). Potential mismatch
states (S1,1/3) and (S2,1/3) are indicated by the second line of equ. (12) whereas
states (S1,2/3) and (S2,2/3) are indicated by the last line of equ. (12). For instance,
if z =( S1,2/3),a ss e e na b o v e , ﬂ PR is chosen with probability p(nL,n R),w h e r e a st h e
optimal choice P ∗
1 occurs with 1 − p(nL,n R).I fz =( S1,1/3),t h e n ﬂ PL is chosen with
probability p(nR,n L) and P ∗
1 is chosen with 1−p(nR,n L). That is, the choice is always
suboptimal, but the utility loss is larger when ﬂ PL is chosen. (Using (10) and (11), it
is easy to verify that the terms in squared brackets in equ. (12) are negative.)
Now consider an upward shift in the number of leftwing diehards, given formally by
ar i s ei nnL. Such a change results in an increase in the probability that both parties
cater to their diehards if x1 =2 /3, p(nL,n R), and a decrease in the corresponding
probability if x1 =1 /3, p(nR,n L). The reason for the fact that an upward shift in
number of leftwing diehards works in two opposite directions may be inferred from
Fig. 2. In panel (a), which depicts the reaction functions for the case x1 =2 /3,
starting from equilibrium, when nL increases, party L, other things equal, tends to
cater to its diehard constituency, thus proposing the platform ﬂ PL instead of mixing
between P∗
1 and ﬂ PL. As the reaction curve of party L shifts downward (dashed line),
so as to maintain the equilibrium in mixed strategies, it is necessary that party R will
22increase the probability of proposing ﬂ PR, thus balancing against the upward shift in
leftwing diehards. (Formally, p(nL,n R) is increasing with respect to nL.) By the same
token, a symmetric argument applies to the case x1 =1 /3, where the roles reverse
such that the reaction curve of party L shifts upward (dashed line in panel (b) of Fig.
2), and equilibrium requires that party R will decrease the probability assigned to ﬂ PR,
in response to a rise in nL. (Formally, p(nR,n L) is decreasing with respect to nL.)
In other words, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, party R is just indiﬀerent between
￿converging￿ (playing P∗
1 if x1 =2 /3 and P∗
2 if x1 =1 /3) and ￿diverging￿ (playing ﬂ PR).
As response to an increase in nL, which other things equal will induce divergence
of party L,p a r t yR will respond by diverging when it appeals to M−voters more
than party L does (which happens when x1 =2 /3, hence the bulk of the M−voters
prefer ﬂ PR to ﬂ PL) and by converging otherwise (namely if x1 =1 /3, hence the bulk
of the M−voters prefer ﬂ PL to ﬂ PR). The implication of the fact that an increase in
polarization works in two opposite directions is the following.
Proposition 5. Under competition, a rise in polarization may increase social
welfare.
Recall that in the monopoly case we demonstrated that a rise in polarization may
be bene￿cial. According to Proposition 5, a rise in polarization may enhance social
welfare in the competitive case as well. To see this, consider again a rise in nL,
and recall the fact that p(nR,n L) is decreasing with respect to nL. Setting u( ﬂ PL,S 1)
low enough (and/or u(P∗
2,S 2) high enough), other things equal, ensures that overall
w e l f a r ed o e si n c r e a s ei nr e s p o n s et oar i s ei nnL, as can be observed from equ. (12).
As can be seen from panel (b) of Fig. 2, polarization may be a force of policy
convergence among parties, which is the ultimate reason for its potentially welfare-
enhancing role. This suggests that the probability that parties do not set the same
platforms (￿probability of divergence￿) may decrease with polarization. It is easy to
con￿rm that this is indeed true. To see this, note that for a given x1 ∈ {1/3,2/3},t h e











































(b) 3 / 1 1 = x  is given by
Γ(nL,n R) ≡ 2 − (3nR/2 − 1/2)(2 − 9nL/4) − (2 − 9nR/4)(3nL/2 − 1/2), (13)
according to Lemma 6. From this, we obtain, for instance, ∂Γ/∂nL < (=,>)0 if
and only if nR < (=,>)11/18.T h u s , f o r a n y nR ∈ (4/9,11/18), the probability of
divergence decreases with nL.
5 Empirical Relevance of Diehards￿ Behavior
A central building block of our model is the behavior of diehard voters. Although
parties￿ objective functions [(2) and (3)] are also consistent with the usually vague
notion of ideology-driven parties (see our discussion in section 2), we have argued that
even fully Downsian parties face a trade-oﬀ in attracting their ￿core￿ constituency,
who only care about ideology, and others (i.e., M−voters), which are characterized by
their capability to process information and make voting decisions according to their
perceptions about the state of the economy. In contrast, policy preferences of diehard
constituencies are independent of the state of the economy but decisions whether to
support their preferred party or to abstain from voting depends on their party￿s policy
platforms. In this section we brie￿y discuss empirical evidence to support our main
assumptions, i.e.,
(i) that party identi￿cation is to a large part driven by ideology,
(ii) that partisanship may give rise to perceptional biases which prevent a switch
to the other party, irrespective of proposed platforms, and
(iii) that abstention of voters from elections is systematically related to alienation
from their preferred party, depending on the distance between a voter￿s preferred
policy and parties￿ proposed policy platforms.
Ad (i): Tab. 1 has given a ￿rst impression about the prevalence of ideology and
party identi￿cation in the US. Not surprisingly, ideology and party identi￿cation are




Table 5: Correlation table of ideology and party identification in the U.S. in 2000. 
(in  percent)  Strong  Weak Independent Weak  Strong  Total 
  Democrat (1)  Democrat (2) (3-5)  Republican (6) Republican (7)  
Extremely Liberal (1)  47.8  17.4  30.4  0  4.4  100 
  5.6 2 1.7 0 0.5  1.9 
Liberal  (2)  38.8 20.2 33.2  3.4  4.5  100 
 35.2  18  14.6  2.8  3.6  14.4 
Middle  (3-5)  13.9 21.2 39.1  20  5.8  100 
  46.4 69.5 63.4 61.5 17.3  53.1 
Conservative (6)  5.4  6.4  23  22.7  42.5  100 
  8.7  10  17.8 33.3 60.5  25.4 
Extremely  Conservative  (7) 12.5 1.6 15.6 7.8 62.5  100 
  4.1 0.5 2.5 2.4  18.2  5.2 
Total  15.9 16.2 32.8 17.3 17.8  100 
  100 100 100 100 100  100 
 
Data source: NES (2002). 
 
Notes: Based on seven-point scale on ideology and party identification. The number in brackets refers to the position in this scale, i.e., the three middle categories 
have been condensed to one for both measures. The first (upper) number in a cell refers to the row percentage (e.g., 47.8 percent of Extreme Liberals are Strong 
Democrats), the second number refers to the column percentage. 
 to be extremely liberal have a strong preference for the Democratic party and 65.2
percent of extreme liberals clearly support the Democrats (although not necessar-
ily strongly). Similarly, 70.3 (62.5) percent of those who are extreme conservatives
identify themselves clearly (strongly) with the Republicans. Moreover, using Tab. 1
and 5, straightforward calculation implies that 39.8 percent of those who report a
clear liberal position are strong democrats, and 45.9 percent of clear conservatives are
strong republicans. Interestingly, empirical evidence suggests a causal relationship
running from ideology to party identi￿cation, rather than vice versa. For instance,
Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) and Schreckhise and Shields (2003) ￿nd support
for ideological realignment among American voters, who seem to seek a congruence
between ideological positions and partisanship.23
Ad (ii): The fundamental aspect of partisanship as identi￿cation to a social group
has already been pointed out in the seminal work on voting behavior by Cambell et
al. (1960). Evidence by Greene (2004) suggests that strong partisans suﬀer from per-
ceptional biases in evaluating their preferred party (involving mental exaggeration of
their party￿s favorable characteristics). He also shows that social identi￿cation with
a party has a substantial eﬀect on both ideological self-placement and partisanship.24
Moreover, the overall feelings towards the non-preferred party is strongly negatively
aﬀected by a person￿s ideology, implying that ￿defection from a party may become
psychologically more diﬃcult, if indeed partisan group belonging does contribute to
one￿s self esteem￿ (Greene, 2004; p. 148). This is consistent with our hypothesis
that ideological voters would - irrespective of proposed policy platforms - not turn to
23Interestingly, both studies suggest that the impact of ideology on party identi￿cation has grown
between the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, whereas the impact of parental partisanship has declined.
Many studies have con￿rmed that party identi￿cation ￿uctuates considerably. For instance, from
the mid-1970s onwards, loyalty towards the Democrat Party has gradually declined, whereas it
has risen towards the Republican Party (see, e.g., Carmines and Stanley, 1992; Abramowitz and
Saunders, 1998). Moreover, although having declined in the 1960s, party identi￿cation has rebounded
signi￿cantly in the 1970s, nowadays being - not surprisingly - the most eﬀective indicator of individual
vote choice (e.g., Bartels, 2000).
24Social identi￿cation relates to the average response of an individual to ten questions which
measure Identi￿cation with a Psychological Group (IDGP), introduced by Mael and Tetrick (1992).
The IDPG-measure is not speci￿c to political parties but has turned out to be a reasonable concept
for measuring identity for a variety of social groups.
25the other party. In a similar vein, using data from 10 European countries, Di Tella
and MacCulloch (2004) present evidence for a strong eﬀect of the party in power on
subjective well-being (￿happiness￿) of partisans, i.e., declared happiness is substan-
tially higher when the preferred party is in power, and substantially lower if it is
not. Also consistent with our modelling of diehard voters, Shachar (2003) concludes
that partisanship involves habit formation from voting. He ￿nds that the probability
to vote for a party signi￿cantly depends on the voting choice in the previous elec-
tion, even when accounting for candidates￿ attributes and policy stands as well as
for voters￿ (observed and unobserved) characteristics. Finally, an intrinsic motivation
to support one￿s preferred party is also re￿ected by evidence on a positive relation-
ship between partisanship and voting participation, as reported by Fiorina (1999) and
Bartels (2000), among others.
Ad (iii): The preceding evidence on partisanship and ideology does not imply,
of course, that parties can be ensured of receiving support from their diehard con-
stituency in any election. First, it has been established that even after controlling for
previous party identi￿cation, issue evaluation (a variable constructed from a respon-
dent￿s position matched with the subjective position of parties on a variety of issues)
signi￿cantly aﬀects party identi￿cation (Franklin, 1992). Second, consistent with our
hypothesis on turnout decisions of diehards, abstention in elections is strongly deter-
mined by alienation, i.e., is a function of the distance from a voter￿s ideal point to
the nearest candidate, as found in both presidential elections (Zipp, 1985; Adams and
Merrill, 2003) and midterm elections (Plane and Gershtenson, 2004).
6C o n c l u s i o n
The prevalence and implications of ideological predispositions and partisanship lie
at the center of the debate in the political economy and political science literature.
Conventional wisdom suggests that increases in ideological polarization shifts parties
away from social optimum as perceived by middle of the road voters (non-aﬃliated to
26parties), i.e., polarization gives rise to divergence between parties￿ policy platforms.
Moreover, delay in desirable policy reforms has been attributed to imperfect informa-
tion of voters about the state of the economy. Viewed separately, both frictions seem
thus to be detrimental for welfare. Plausibly assuming that frictions in the process of
information diﬀusion exist, however, our analysis has shown that a shift in ideological
polarization may increase welfare by mitigating the eﬀects of information stickiness.
We have demonstrated the potential welfare-enhancing role of increased polariza-
tion under diﬀerent regimes diﬀering in the degree of political competition, empha-
sizing its two-way eﬀect on the likelihood of desirable reforms responding to changes
in the economic fundamentals. We examined two cases, the ￿rst in which a single
strategic party is setting its platform optimally, given a ￿xed platform of the other
(passive) party, and a second more compelling one in which a full-￿edged competi-
tion between the two parties takes place. In the former case we have shown that
increased polarization may be welfare-enhancing as it not only gives rise to a delay in
desirable reforms opposed by the strategic party￿s core constituency, but also speeds
up called-for delayed reforms in the opposite direction. In the perhaps more relevant
case of two competing parties, our analysis suggests that policy platforms converge
if there is suﬃcient consensus among voters about the state of the economy, whereas
ideological polarization matters for policy platforms in absence of such consensus. We
have demonstrated that, in the latter case, shifts in polarization give rise to strategic
eﬀects which may reduce the probability of policy divergence. In turn, this converging
force allows for a potentially welfare-enhancing role of ideological polarization, when




Proof of Proposition 1: A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a1, there are three intervals to con-
sider. Note that within each interval the number of M−voters is ￿xed. Thus, we
can solve the maximization of party L in two stages. First, for each interval we
choose the platform which maximizes the number of diehard voters, being the left-
most point of each interval, according to our assumption that ￿ PL =m i n ( P,P0) if
πL(P, ﬂ PR)=πL(P 0, ﬂ PR). In the second stage, we choose amongst the intervals.
Formally, ￿ PL ∈ { ﬂ PL,Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR),Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR)}. N o t et h a tb yv i r t u eo fo u ra s s u m p t i o n
that M−voters support party L when being indiﬀerent between platforms set by
the two parties, we have ￿ PL = ﬂ PL if πL( ﬂ PL, ﬂ PR)=πL(Pmin
i ( ﬂ PR), ﬂ PR), i =1 ,2,
and ￿ PL = Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) if πL(Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR), ﬂ PR)=πL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR), ﬂ PR). Also note that when
P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) > ﬂ PL and FL(P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL < 1,ad e v i a t i o nf r o mﬂ PL to P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) is
pro￿table. In such a case ﬂ PL is suboptimal, and we only need to consider the two
other possibilities, namely, P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) and Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR). (The latter holds trivially, when
ﬂ PL = Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR).) A switch from P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) to Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) would be pro￿table if the
bene￿t( M−voters who believe in S1) outweighs the costs (a loss of diehards). For-
mally, this is the case when x1 >c ( ﬂ PR, ﬂ PL,n L),a n dv i c ev e r s a .I fx1 = c( ﬂ PR, ﬂ PL,n L),
then party L chooses P min
2 ( ﬂ PR),s i n c ePmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) is closer to Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) under A1.T h i s
concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : First, let us de￿ne pi,k ≡ prob{z =( Si,k/K)}, k =
0,1,...,K. (For notional simplicity, we omit the time index t.) Note that p1,0 =
p2,K =0 , since at least a mass 1/K of the M−voters is correctly informed about the
actual state of the economy at any date, according to (1). Thus,
K X
k=1
(p1,k + p2,k−1)=1 (A.1)
must hold. Next, we derive further relationships between the probabilities of all
28possible values of the state variable zt as t →∞ . This stochastic process is a random
walk with two absorbing states, (S1,1) and (S2,0).A c c o r d i n gt o( 1), there are three
possibilities to be in state (S1,1). Either we have been in (S1,1) or (S2,(K − 1)/K)
in the previous period and the economy stayed in S1, which happens with probability
q,o rw eh a v eb e e ni n(S1,(K − 1)/K) a n ds w i t c h e dt o(S1,1), which happens with
probability 1 − q.T h u s ,t h er e l a t i o n s h i p
p1,K = q(p1,K−1 + p1,K)+( 1− q)p2,K−1 (A.2)
must hold. Similarly, there are three possibilities to be in state (S2,0).E i t h e rw eh a v e
been in (S2,0) or (S2,1/K) before and the economy stayed in S2 (with probability q),
or we have been in (S1,1/K) and switched to (S2,0), which happens with probability
1 − q.T h u s ,
p2,0 = q(p2,0 + p2,1)+( 1− q)p1,1.( A . 3 )
Moreover, symmetry implies
p1,K = p2,0 ≡ ￿ p. (A.4)
Now consider state (S1,1/K). The only possibility to be in this state is that state
(S2,0) prevailed in the previous period, and the state of the economy switched from
S2 to S1, which happens with probability 1 − q.T h u s ,p1,1 =( 1− q)p2,0. Similarly,
being in state (S2,(K−1)/K) is only possible if state (S1,1) prevailed in the previous
period, and the state of the economy switched from S1 to S2, which also happens with
probability 1 − q. Using (A.4), we thus ￿nd the relationships
p1,1 = p2,K−1 =( 1− q)￿ p. (A.5)
Next, consider states (S1,k/K), k =2 ,...,K − 1. To be in state (S1,k/K) requires
either that the economy stayed in S1 (with probability q), i.e., the previous state was
(S1,(k − 1)/K),o rm o v e df r o m(S2,(k − 1)/K) to (S1,k/K), which happens with
29probability 1 − q. Thus, the relationships
p1,k = qp1,k−1 +( 1− q)p2,k−1, k =2 ,...,K − 1 (A.6)
must hold. Similarly, to be in state (S2,k/K), k =1 ,...,K−2, requires either that the
economy stayed in S2 (with probability q), i.e., the previous state was (S2,(k+1)/K),
or moved from (S1,(k +1 ) /K) to (S2,k/K), which happens with probability 1 − q.
Thus,
p2,k = qp2,k+1 +( 1− q)p1,k+1, k =1 ,...,K − 2.( A . 7 )
We now use (A.1)-(A.7) to solve for the 2K unknowns p1,k, p2,k−1, k =1 ,...,K.25
First, combining (A.2) and (A.4) yields ￿ p = p1,K−1q/(1 − q)+p2,K−1.T h u s , u s i n g
p2,K−1 =( 1− q)￿ p from (A.5), we obtain p1,K−1 =( 1− q)￿ p.N o w , u s i n g ( A . 7 ) f o r
k = K − 2, i.e., p2,K−2 = qp2,K−1 +( 1− q)p1,K−1,a n du s i n gb o t hp2,K−1 =( 1− q)￿ p
and p1,K−1 =( 1− q)￿ p yields p2,K−2 =( 1− q)￿ p. In analogous considerations, one can
show that in fact pi,k =( 1− q)￿ p for all i =1 ,2,k=1 ,...,K − 1,w h i c hc o n ￿rms (7).
Substituting this and (A.4) into (A.1), we obtain 2￿ p +2 ( K − 1)(1 − q)￿ p =1 ,w h i c h
yields (6). This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . First, we calculate the probabilities α2,1 and α1,2.
(Recall that α1,1 =0 .5 − α2,1 and α2,2 =0 .5 − α1,2.) If k/K ≤ c<(k +1 ) /K,
k =1 ,...,K − 1, then there are exactly k events in which the state of the economy
is S1 and x1 ≤ c, i.e., P min
2 is chosen, according to part (c) of Proposition 1.26 Thus,
using Lemma 2, we have α2,1 = k(1 − q)￿ p if k/K ≤ c<(k +1 ) /K, k =1 ,...,K − 1.
Similarly, there are exactly K − 1 − k events in which the state of the economy is
S2 and x1 >c , i.e., P min
1 is chosen. (Recall that c ∈ (0,1) under assumption A1 and
presumption FL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL < 1.) If c<1/K,t h e nPmin
1 is chosen whenever
x1 > 0.T h u s ,i fc<1/K, there is no mismatch if S = S1 (i.e., Z2,1 = ∅), but hence,
except for the case x1 =0 , there is always a mismatch if S = S2 (i.e., there are K −1
25Note that (A.1)-(A.7) give us 2K +2equations. One can show that two relationships are indeed
redundant, due to the interdependency of the transition probabilities.
26These events are (S1,1/K),..., (S1,k/K). Recall that (S1,0) is impossible, i.e., p1,0 =0 .

























Now consider comparative-statics with respect to changes in K (parts (i) of (a) and
(b) of Proposition 2). Since party L chooses Pmin
2 if x1 =0and Pmin
1 if x1 =1 ,p e r f e c t
information (K =1 ) implies α1,2 = α2,1 =0 .T h u s ,E(u)=β if K =1 , according to
(8). If K>1, however, either α2,1 > 0 or α1,2 > 0 or both, according to (A.8) and
(A.9). Thus, if ∆1,2 < 0 holds (in addition to ∆2,1 < 0), E(u) < β if K>1 (part
(a)). If ∆1,2 > 0 (part (b)), however, welfare may be higher if K>1 than if K =1 .
Indeed, this holds whenever α1,2∆1,2 > −α2,1∆2,1, according to (8). Using that both
sides of this inequality are strictly positive under presumption ∆1,2 > 0,i fα1,2 > 0,
α2,1 > 0 and K>1,c o n ￿rms the claim. Analogously, it is also easy to show, by using
(A.8) and (A.9), that welfare may rise after an increase from K>1 to ￿ K>Kwhen
∆1,2 > 0. It remains to be shown how welfare changes in the case ∆1,2 < 0 after an
increase from K>1 to ￿ K = K +1 . Denote the welfare level after such a change by
￿ E(u). Now consider the case in which the number of elements in, say, Z2,1 remains
unchanged when K changes (given c), denoted by ﬂ κ.T h e n
E(u)=
0.5ﬂ κ(1 − q)
1+( K − 1)(1 − q)
∆2,1 +
0.5(K − 1 − ﬂ κ)(1 − q)




0.5ﬂ κ(1 − q)
1+K(1 − q)
∆2,1 +
0.5(K − ﬂ κ)(1 − q)
1+K(1 − q)
∆1,2 + β,
according to (A.8), (A.9) and (8). Observing that ∆1,2 < 0, it is straightforward to
show that ￿ E(u) <E (u) if and only if ∆2,1/∆1,2 < 1+1/[ﬂ κ(1 − q)].S i n c eﬂ κ ≤ K −1,
this holds if ∆2,1/∆1,2 < 1+1/[(K − 1)(1 − q)]. In a similar fashion, one could assume
31that the number of elements in Z1,2 remain unchanged. In sum, we then obtain that





(K − 1)(1 − q)
,
which holds for any {∆2,1,∆1,2} if K is suﬃciently small.27 This con￿rms parts (i) of
(a) and (b).
Now we turn to the proof of parts (ii) of (a) and (b). Note from (A.8) and (A.9)
that, if anything, α2,1 increases and α1,2 decreases after an increase in nL (which
implies an increase in c). Thus, there are generally counteracting eﬀects of an increase
in nL on E(u) if ∆1,2 < 0, according to (8), leaving the impact on welfare generally
ambiguous as stated in part (a). However, when ∆1,2 > 0, if anything, the terms
α2,1∆2,1 and α1,2∆1,2 decrease with nL.T h u s , E(u) decreases with nL as stated in
part (b).
Finally, consider an increase in q.N o t et h a t∂α2,1/∂q<0 and ∂α1,2/∂q ≤ 0 (with
strict inequality if c<(K − 1)/K), according to (A.8) and (A.9), respectively. Parts
(iii) of (a) and (b) then directly follow from expression (8) for expected utility. This
concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3: Let, without loss of generality, P∗
1 ≥ P∗
2. First, consider the
behavior of party L in response to PR ∈ (P ∗
1, ﬂ PR].N o t et h a ti tm a yb eo p t i m a lt os e t
PL = ﬂ PL (e.g., when nL is high). Also note that, if xi > 0, setting PL slightly above
P min
i (PR) is always preferred to PL = P min
i (PR), i =1 ,2. To see the latter, note that
choosing PL slightly above P min
i (PR) attracts at least a mass xi of M−voters, whereas
setting PL = Pmin
i (PR) attracts only 0.5xi of M−voters with perception ￿ S = Si,
i =1 ,2, by virtue of our assumption that half of the M−voters go to either party
when being indiﬀerent between the policy proposals of the two parties. The cost in
terms of diehards when deviating slightly from Pmin
i (PR),h o w e v e r ,i sm a r g i n a l( b y
continuity of FL(γ)). But since policy space P is continuous, if choosing PL slightly
above P min
i (PR) yields a higher payoﬀ than πL( ﬂ PL,P R), then there does not exist
27Note that it trivially follows for K =1 , and that, for ∆2,1 = ∆1,2,i th o l d sf o ra l lK.
32ab e s tr e s p o n s et oPR ∈ (P ∗
1, ﬂ PR]. By an analogous argument, if PR ∈ [ ﬂ PL,P∗
2),
then PR = ﬂ PR is the only candidate for a best response of party R. This implies
that Py = ﬂ Py, y = L,R, may be an equilibrium, but no strategy pair such that
PR ∈ (P∗
1, ﬂ PR) or PR ∈ ( ﬂ PL,P∗
2). Second, if PR = P ∗
1, the optimal response of party
L may be P∗
1 or ﬂ PL.G i v e nPL = ﬂ PL, we have already seen that PR = ﬂ PR is the only
candidate for a best response of party R. Also note that by a similar argument as
used above, setting PL slightly above P min
2 (P ∗
1) is always preferred to PL = Pmin
2 (P∗
1)
if x2 > 0.( I fx2 =0 ,p a r t yL cannot gain from deviating from P ∗
1 or ﬂ PL, respectively,
in response to PR = P∗
1.) Thus, if PR = P∗
1, then no other strategy than PL = P∗
1
can be part of an equilibrium. The same holds vice versa. Similarly, if PR = P∗
2,t h e n
no other strategy than PL = P∗
2 can be part of an equilibrium, and vice versa. This
concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :First, we show that in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
with PL = PR = P∗
i ,w eh a v exi > 0.5, i =1 ,2. For instance, suppose to the contrary
that PL = PR = P ∗
1 is an equilibrium and x1 ≤ 0.5. Now consider a deviation of
party L to PL ∈ (P∗
2,P∗
1).I nt h i sc a s e ,p a r t yL would gain a mass x2 −0.5=0 .5−x1
of M−voters under A2, in addition to a strictly positive mass of diehards. (Recall
ﬂ γ ≥ ﬂ PR − ﬂ PL.) Thus, if x1 ≤ 0.5, it cannot be an equilibrium that both parties set
P ∗
1. Analogously, PL = PR = P∗
2 cannot be an equilibrium if x2 =1− x1 ≤ 0.5.
For the next step, again, suppose PL = PR = P∗
1.I fp a r t yR deviates by moving
to ﬂ PR, it (exactly) gains a mass nR −
¡£
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assumption A2). Thus, if FR
¡ ﬂ PR − P ∗
1
¢
nR > 0.5 it would be pro￿table to do so. Anal-











¡ ﬂ PR − P ∗
1
¢
nR ≤ 0.5 and FL
¡
P∗
1 − ﬂ PL
¢
nL ≤ 0.5 are both nec-
essary for PL = PR = P ∗
1 to be an equilibrium. In an analogous way, it is easy to
see that both FR
¡ ﬂ PR − P∗
2
¢
nR ≤ 0.5 and FL
¡
P∗
2 − ﬂ PL
¢
nL ≤ 0.5 are necessary for
PL = PR = P∗
2 to be an equilibrium. This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 .First, recall from Lemma 3 that Py = ﬂ Py for y = L,R and
33PL = PR ∈ {P∗
1,P∗
2} are the only candidates for Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Lemma 5 is proven by distinguishing all possible scenarios regarding the relationship
of utility of M−voters, u(P,S), S ∈ S,a td i ﬀerent policies P ∈ { ﬂ PL, ﬂ PR}.
Scenario 1: First, suppose that M−individuals are strictly better oﬀ under plat-
form ﬂ PR than under ﬂ PL if the state of the economy is Si but vice versa if it is Si0,
i0 6= i; e.g., let
u( ﬂ PL,S 1) <u ( ﬂ PR,S 1) and u( ﬂ PL,S 2) >u ( ﬂ PR,S 2). (A.10)
Then both P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) > ﬂ PL = P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) and P max
2 ( ﬂ PL) < ﬂ PR = Pmax
1 ( ﬂ PL) hold, as can
be seen from Fig. 3. Now suppose PL = ﬂ PL and PR = ﬂ PR.T h e n p a r t y L attracts
af r a c t i o nx2 =1− x1 of M−individuals, whereas party R attracts the remaining
fraction x1. Now, for instance, if party L deviates by proposing a platform slightly
above P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) (given PR = ﬂ PR)i ta t t r a c t sa l lM−voters. Thus, ﬂ PL is the (unique)
optimal response to ﬂ PR if and only if nL + x2 ≥
£
1 − FL(P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)
⁄
nL +1 ,
which is equivalent to FL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL ≥ 1 − x2 = x1. Similarly, for party R,
ﬂ PR is the (unique) optimal response to ﬂ PL if and only if FR( ﬂ PR − P max
2 ( ﬂ PL))nR ≥
1 − x1 = x2.N o wn o t et h a tPmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) <P ∗
1 and Pmax
2 ( ﬂ PL) >P ∗
2 (see Fig. 3). Thus,
if PL = PR = P ∗
1 is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., x1 > 0.5 and FL(P∗
1 − ﬂ PL)nL ≤ 0.5,
according to Lemma 4, it is impossible that FL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL ≥ x1 > 0.5 holds
at the same time. Similarly, if PL = PR = P ∗
2 in Nash equilibrium (such that x2 > 0.5
and FR( ﬂ PR − P∗
2)nR ≤ 0.5, according to Lemma 4) it is impossible that FR( ﬂ PR −
P max
2 ( ﬂ PL))nR ≥ x2 > 0.5 holds at the same time. However, if Py = ﬂ Py for y = L,R
is a Nash equilibrium for some x1 ∈ [0,1],t h e ne i t h e rFL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL ≥ 0.5
or FR( ﬂ PR − Pmax
2 ( ﬂ PL))nR ≥ 0.5 must hold, with strict inequality if x1 6=0 .5.T h u s ,
for any x1 such that Py = ﬂ Py for y = L,R is a Nash equilibrium, at least one
necessary condition for PL = PR = P ∗
i to be an equilibrium is violated, i =1 ,2.
It is easy to check that analogous arguments apply if u( ﬂ PL,S 1) >u ( ﬂ PR,S 1) and
u( ﬂ PL,S 2) <u ( ﬂ PR,S 2).28
28To see this, note that if Py = ﬂ Py for y = L,R is a Nash equilibrium, then both FL(Pmin
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2 L P PScenario 2: Next suppose u( ﬂ PL,S i) <u ( ﬂ PR,S i) for i =1 ,2.T h a ti s ,i fPL = ﬂ PL
and PR = ﬂ PR,t h e np a r t yL gets nL votes, whereas party R gets nR +1votes.
(Again, the following arguments apply in a similar way to the opposite case in which
u( ﬂ PL,S i) >u ( ﬂ PR,S i) for i =1 ,2.) Now, given PR = ﬂ PR,p a r t yL can attract at
least a mass xi of M−voters (who believe that the state of the economy is Si)b y
choosing PL slightly above Pmin
i ( ﬂ PR).T h u s ,f o rPL = ﬂ PL being the optimal response
to PR = ﬂ PR, it is necessary that nL ≥
£
1 − FL(P min
i ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)
⁄
nL + xi for i =1 ,2.
That is, FL(P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL ≥ x1 and FL(Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL ≥ 1 − x1 must hold
simultaneously. Now note that Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR) <P ∗
1 and Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) <P ∗
2.T h u s , i f t h e
presumptions of Lemma 4 hold and PL = PR = P ∗
i is a Nash equilibrium for some
xi (> 0.5), i =1 ,2, it is impossible that Py = ﬂ Py for y = L,R is a Nash equilibrium
at the same time. Vice versa, if Py = ﬂ Py for y = L,R is a Nash equilibrium for some
x1, then either FL(Pmin
1 ( ﬂ PR)− ﬂ PL)nL ≥ 0.5 or FL(P min
2 ( ﬂ PL)− ﬂ PL)nL ≥ 0.5 must hold,
with strict inequality if x1 6=0 .5. Thus, for any x1 such that Py = ﬂ Py for y = L,R
is a Nash equilibrium, at least one necessary condition for PL = PR = P ∗
i to be an
equilibrium is violated, i =1 ,2, according to Lemma 4.
Scenario 3: Finally, consider the case in which u( ﬂ PL,S i)=u( ﬂ PR,S i) for at least
one i =1 ,2. In this case, given PR = ﬂ PR, a slight deviation of party L from ﬂ PL yields
a gain of at least a mass 0.5xi of M−voters, whereas the loss of diehards is marginal
by continuity of FL.T h u s ,i fu( ﬂ PL,S i)=u( ﬂ PR,S i) for all i =1 ,2, the strategy pair
Py = ﬂ Py, y = L,R, cannot be an equilibrium. If, say, u( ﬂ PL,S 1)=u( ﬂ PR,S 1) and
u( ﬂ PL,S 2) <u ( ﬂ PR,S 2),f o r ﬂ PL being the optimal response to PR = ﬂ PR, it is necessary
that both x1 =0and FL(Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL ≥ 1 − 0.5x1 simultaneously hold. Thus,
x1 =0and FL(Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL ≥ 1 must hold. In this case, however, neither
PL = PR = P∗
1 nor PL = PR = P ∗
2 can be a Nash equilibrium, since necessary condition
x1 > 0.5 is violated for the former and FL(P∗
2 − ﬂ PL)nL ≤ 0.5 is violated for the latter
(recall P∗
2 >P min
2 ( ﬂ PR)). Similar arguments hold whenever u( ﬂ PL,S i)=u( ﬂ PR,S i) for
ﬂ PL)nL ≥ x2 and FR( ﬂ PR − Pmax
1 ( ﬂ PL))nR ≥ x1 must hold if u( ﬂ PL,S 1) >u ( ﬂ PR,S 1) and u( ﬂ PL,S 2) <
u( ﬂ PR,S 2).A l s o n o t e t h a t Pmax
1 ( ﬂ PL) >P ∗
1 and Pmin
2 ( ﬂ PR) <P ∗
2. The remainder of the proof is
exactly analogous.
35one i =1 ,2. This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .First, suppose PL = PR = P ∗
1 and x1 > 0.5.( R e c a l l
from Lemma 4 that x1 > 0.5 is necessary for PL = PR = P ∗
1 to be an equilibrium.)
For party R, any deviation to the left of P∗
1 is not bene￿cial because it loses both
diehards and (at least) a mass 0.5 − x2 = x1 − 0.5 > 0 of M−voters. Similarly,
any deviation of party L to the right of P∗
1 is not bene￿cial because it loses both
diehards and all M−voters. Now let us consider three other possible scenarios for
deviating behavior from PL = PR = P∗
1, starting with party R.I f p a r t y R moves
to the right of P∗
1,i tl o s e sa l lM−voters, i.e., the best is to go to ﬂ PR.W e a l r e a d y
know from the proof of Lemma 4 that this does not pay if FR




which is implied by presumption FR
¡ ﬂ PR − P ∗
2
¢
nR ≤ 0.5 under assumption A2. Now,






1.) Since this implies a loss of all M−voters, the best is
to go to ﬂ PL. We already know from the proof of Lemma 4 that this does not raise
the payoﬀ of party L if FL
¡
P∗
1 − ﬂ PL
¢
nL ≤ 0.5, as presumed. Finally, consider the
case in which party L deviates to a point PL ∈ (P min
2 (P∗
1),P∗
1). In this case party
L will get support from exactly a mass x2 =1− x1 of M−individuals. Since the
best is to go as far to the left as possible while retaining these M−voters, PL is
set slightly above P min
2 (P ∗






1 − ﬂ PL
¢⁄






1) − ﬂ PL
¢⁄
nL,w h i c hi s
equivalent to x1 ≥ ﬂ x(nL, ﬂ PL,P∗
1) ∈ (0.5,1). Observing the uniqueness result in Lemma
5, this con￿rms part (i).
To prove part (ii), suppose PL = PR = P∗
2 and x2 > 0.5,i . e . ,x1 < 0.5. For similar
reasons as above, any deviation of party L to the right of P ∗
2 and any deviation of party
R to the left of P ∗
2 is not pro￿table. Moreover, analogously to the previous case, it is
easy to show that, by presumption, it does not pay for party L to deviate in any other
way. For party R, any deviation to the right of P max
1 (P∗








2)). Setting PR slightly below P max
1 (P∗
2) does not raise the payoﬀ for party
36R if and only if 0.5+
£
1 − FR
¡ ﬂ PR − P ∗
2
¢⁄
nR ≥ x1 +
£
1 − FR





which is equivalent to x1 ≤ x(nR, ﬂ PR,P∗
2) ∈ (0,0.5). Using Lemma 5, this con￿rms
part (ii).
To prove part (iii), ￿rst, note that presumptions FL
¡
P∗
1 − ﬂ PL
¢
nL ≤ 0.5 and
FR
¡ ﬂ PR − P∗
2
¢





1 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL
¢
nL < 0.5 and FR
¡ ﬂ PR − P
max
2 ( ﬂ PL)
¢
nR < 0.5 (A.11)
since P min
1 ( ﬂ PR) <P∗
1 and P max
2 ( ﬂ PL) >P∗





2 ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL
¢
nL < 0.5 and FR
¡ ﬂ PR − P
max
1 ( ﬂ PL)
¢
nR < 0.5 (A.12)
since P min
2 ( ﬂ PR) <P ∗
2 <P ∗
1 and Pmax
1 ( ﬂ PL) >P ∗
1 >P ∗
2, respectively. Now re-
call from Lemma 3 together with the proofs of parts (i) and (ii) that, if x1 ∈
¡
x(nR, ﬂ PR,P∗
2), ﬂ x(nL, ﬂ PL,P∗
1)
¢
, the only candidate for a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies is Py = ﬂ Py, y = L,R. Moreover, recall from the proof of Lemma 5 that
for Py = ﬂ Py, y = L,R, to be a Nash equilibrium, FL(Pmin
i ( ﬂ PR) − ﬂ PL)nL ≥ 0.5 or
FR( ﬂ PR −Pmax
i ( ﬂ PL))nR ≥ 0.5 must hold for at least one i =1 ,2. However, it is impos-
sible that these conditions hold if both (A.11)a n d( A . 12) are ful￿lled. This concludes
the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. The second part of the proposition follows immediately
from standard existence theorems of Nash equilibrium, when the strategy space is
￿nite. We thus turn to prove the ￿r s tp a r to fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . C o n s i d e r￿rst the
scenario described by part (i) of Proposition 3. Obviously, any Nash equilibrium in
the continuum case is also Nash equilibrium with a grid. However, we need to ensure
that no other Nash equilibrium exists. For any pair of strategies, (PL,P R) 6=( P ∗
1,P∗
1),
we de￿ne the following two sets, for party L and R, respectively, that describe the
37payoﬀ derived by each party for any possible strategy:
ΠL (PR) ≡
'
πL (P,PR) | P ∈





πR (PL,P) | P ∈
£ ﬂ PL, ﬂ PR
⁄“
.
Let ﬂ ΠL (PR) ≡ sup[ΠL(PR)] and ﬂ ΠR (PL) ≡ sup[ΠR (PL)] denote, correspondingly,
the least upper-bounds associated with the two sets. It is easy to verify using our
earlier notation that the following holds:
ﬂ ΠL (PR) ∈
n
πL








































Let HL (PL,P R) ≡ ﬂ ΠL (PR)−πL (PL,P R) and HR (PL,P R) ≡ ﬂ ΠR (PL)−πR (PL,P R)
denote the upper-bound gains of deviating from PL and PR for party L and R,r e -
spectively, and let ﬂ H (PL,P R) ≡ max[HL(PL,P R),H R (PL,P R)].W e n e e d t o s h o w
that any (PL,P R) 6=( P ∗
1,P∗
1) does not form a Nash equilibrium for a suﬃciently ￿ne
grid. By construction, and by the de￿nition of equilibrium, ﬂ H (PL,P R) > 0.W ew i l l
separate now between two cases.
Case 1: Consider ￿rst the case in which either ﬂ H (PL,P R)=HL(PL,P R) and
ﬂ ΠL(PR)=πL
¡ ﬂ PL,P R
¢





such a case, it is easy to verify, as ﬂ PL and ﬂ PR are part of the grid, that this does not
form equilibrium. We turn next to the other, more complicated case.
Case 2: The other possible scenarios can be described as a union of two sets
(de￿ned for party L and R, respectively). Let Θ = ΘL ∪ ΘR,w h e r e
ΘL (PL,P R) ≡
'
HL (PL,P R) | HL (PL,P R)= ﬂ H (PL,P R) and ﬂ ΠL(PR) 6= πL
¡ ﬂ PL,P R
¢“
,
ΘR (PL,P R) ≡
'





38Denote by Θ ≡ inf [Θ] the largest lower bound of the set Θ.B y c o n s t r u c t i o n
Θ ≥ 0.W et u r nn e x tt op r o v et h a tΘ > 0. Assume by negation that Θ =0 .T h i si m -
plies that, for any ε > 0,t h e r ee x i s t sap a i r(PL,P R) such that ﬂ H (PL,P R) ∈ Θ
and ﬂ H (PL,P R) ∈ (0,ε). Consider an arbitrary small ε > 0, and without loss
in generality, let ﬂ H (PL,P R)=HL (PL,P R)=ε0 < ε.I f ε is small, the gain
from deviation necessarily derives from an increase in the support of diehard left-
ists, thus PL necessarily lies in a small neighborhood to the right of either P min
2 (PR)
or Pmin
1 (PR). For concreteness and with no loss in generality, assume the latter,
namely, party L sets its policy slightly above the point at which M−voters with










1 (PR) − ﬂ PL
¢⁄




1 (PR) fL(P − ﬂ PL)dP (recall that fL is the density of the distribution of vot-
ing utility γ for leftist diehards). Hence, ε0 ≥ nL[PL − P min
1 (PR)]fmin
L ,w h e r et h e
min superscript refers to the smallest density in the support (which is well de￿ned
by the continuity of fL and the fact that the policy space is bounded), implying
x ≡ PL − P min
1 (PR) ≤ ε0/[nLfmin
L ].T h e i n ￿mum distance (from PR)t h a tp a r t yR
has to shift its policy in order to attract the M−voters with perception ￿ S = S1 (re-
call that the minimal measure of such voters is 1/K)i sg i v e nb yPR − P max
1 (PL),







easy to verify that Q(0) = 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,Q(•) is increasing and continuous. Thus,
Q(PL − P min
1 (PR)) ≤ Q(ε0/[nLfmin




1 (PR)) fR( ﬂ PR − PR)dP.H o w e v e r , u s i n g t h e f a c t t h a t Q(PL −
P min
1 (PR)) ≤ Q(ε0/[nLfmin
L ]) and denoting fmax
R is the largest density in the support
of fR,w eo b t a i n
ε












For ε0 =0 ,a sQ(0) = 0, this inequality is violated, i.e., HL (PL,P R) <H R (PL,P R).
By virtue of continuity, this holds for suﬃciently small ε0 > 0. This establishes that
Θ > 0 by contradiction. We can repeat the same argument for the other two scenarios
39[described by parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3] and de￿ne by di,d ii and diii,t h e
largest lower bounds, for each scenario, respectively (with di = Θ). We further let
d =m i n( di,d ii,d iii) > 0. We conclude that any grid including the bliss points (P∗
i ,
i =1 ,2) and the end points ( ﬂ PL and ﬂ PR), such that the distance between two adjacent
points is lower than d, maintains the results of Proposition 3. This completes the
proof. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 .We start with x1 =2 /3, ￿rst showing that there exists no
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the game described in Tab. 4. Consider ￿rst
party L.I fp a r t yR proposes the platform P ∗
1,p a r t yL￿s best response would be to
propose ﬂ PL if and only if nL +1/6 >n L/4+1/2, which holds if and only if nL > 4/9.
By our parametric restrictions this indeed holds. However, when party L proposes ﬂ PL,
party R￿s best response is P ∗
1 if and only if nR/2+5/6 >n R+2/3, which holds if and
only if nR < 1/3. This, however, violates our parametric assumption that nR > 4/9.
Suppose next, that party R proposes the platform ﬂ PR.P a r t yL￿s best response would
be to propose P∗
1 if and only if nL/4+1>n L +1 /3, which holds if and only if
nL < 8/9. By virtue of our parametric assumption, nL < 2/3, hence this indeed holds
true. Turning next to party R,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a ti t sb e s tr e s p o n s ew h e nP ∗
1 is
proposed by party L,i st op r o p o s eP ∗
1,a snR/2+1 /2 >n R,b e c a u s enR < 2/3.W e
conclude that no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists for the case x1 =2 /3.
We next turn to characterize the equilibrium in mixed strategies. Denote by
ENy(P) the expected utility derived by party y = L,R when proposing the platform

























































Equating (A.13) and (A.14) (for party L)a n d( A . 15) and (A.16) (for party R), respec-
tively, and following some algebraic manipulations con￿rms the ￿r s tp a r to fL e m m a
6. For x1 =1 /3 the result follows by symmetry. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 . Recall, from the proof of Lemma 2, the de￿nition pi,k =
prob{z =( Si,k/K)},w h e r ek =0 ,1,2,3 for K =3 . Using the symmetry property,
E(u)=p1,1{p(nR,n L)u( ﬂ PL,S 1)+[ 1− p(nR,n L)]u(P
∗
2,S 1)} +








p2,1{p(nR,n L)u( ﬂ PL,S 2)+[ 1− p(nR,n L)]u(P
∗
2,S 2)} +
p2,2{p(nL,n R)u( ﬂ PR,S 2)+[ 1− p(nL,n R)]u(P
∗
1,S 2)}. (A.17)








B. A Positive Measure of Policy Reform Stickiness
A natural positive measure for policy reform stickiness is given by the mean time
between switches, namely the mean time it takes to switch between policies. Note
that in the monopolistic case, there are two policies in the equilibrium support (in
the competitive case of section 4, there are four elements, so one can apply the same
technique with the required modi￿cations). We turn to calculate the measure.









.D e n o t eb y￿ k the largest k, such that k/K is lower than c.T h i s
describes a transition state, namely a state in which a policy switch has a positive









,d e n o t e db yφ2,1, is therefore given by (employing the
notation used in the proof of Lemma 2): φ2,1 = p1,￿ kq + p2,￿ k(1 − q).









.T h e ￿rst is the case where the economy is in a transition
state and S1 prevails, requiring (for a switch to take place) that the economy will
remain in S1. The other scenario is the one in which S2 prevails, and a shift to S1 is
required for a switch to occur. By a symmetric argument, it follows that the frequency








is given by φ1,2 = p1,￿ k+1(1 − q)+p2,￿ k+1q.









versa) is thus given by φ ≡ φ2,1 + φ1,2. Substitution from (6) and (7) yield:
φ =
1 − q
1+( K − 1)(1 − q)
. (B.1)
For any ￿nite horizon, T, of the economy, the mean time between switches, denoted
by MTBS,m a yb ec a l c u l a t e db yMTBS = T/(1 + NOS),w h e r eNOS denotes the
number of switches. When T goes to in￿nity, NOS/T → φ,a n dMTBS → 1/φ =
(1 − q)−1 + K − 1. Obviously, as the friction in information rises (K increases) and
the degree of persistence rises (q rises) the mean time between switches rises.
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